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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 990096-CA 
v. : 
BRUCE K. HALLIDAY, Individually and : Priority No. 15 
in his official capacity, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The instant action comes within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0 (1996). On April 13, 1999, this 
matter was transferred to this Court by the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Plaintiff cannot challenge the assignment of this action to Judge John R. 
Anderson for the first time on appeal. Even if such a challenge could be raised for the 
first time in this court, plaintiff has failed to state any bias on the part of the judge that 
would be legally sufficient to warrant his recusal. 
1 
This issue was not raised in the trial court but is raised for the first time on appeal 
by the plaintiff. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not 
entail review of the district court's decision. If a motion to recuse Judge John R. 
Anderson had been made in the trial court, it would be reviewed for correctness. State in 
Interest of ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1998) 
2. The plaintiffs statutory action, seeking forfeiture against the defendant judge, 
was correctly dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to timely file an adequate notice 
of claim as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.1 
This issue was raised by the defendant in his motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. R. 100-2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it 
under a correctness standard. Matter of Estate of West 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997); 
Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990). "In matters of 
pure statutory interpretation, an appellate court reviews a trial court's ruling for 
1
 This argument will respond to this court's order that the defendant address the 
issues "Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act apply to a claim under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35-1 and require additional proof of 'fraud and malice' in order to recover the 
statutory penalty?" Order of June 16, 1999. 
2 
correctness and gives no deference to its legal conclusions." Stephens v. Bonneville 
Travel Inc.. 935 P.2d 5185 519 (Utah 1997). 
3. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the defendant judge.2 
This issue was raised by the defendant in his motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. R. 99-100. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it 
under a correctness standard. Matter of Estate of West 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997); 
Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990). 
4. Plaintiffs claims against the defendant judge are barred by res judicata.3 
This issue was raised by the defendant in his motion for judgment on the 
pleadings. R. 99-100. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This matter was decided below upon the 
defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this issue raises only 
questions of law, the Court should give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it 
2
 This argument will respond to this court's order that the defendant address the 
issue "What does 'wrongful and willful refusal to allow a writ' mean within the context 
of §78-35-1?" 
3
 This argument will respond to this court's order that the defendant address the 
issue "Does proof of wrongful and willful refusal to allow a writ of habeas corpus under 
§ 78-35-1 require a prior appellate ruling that the refusal was erroneous?" 
3 
under a correctness standard. Matter of Estate of West 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 1997); 
Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 897, 898 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2 Definitions. (Supp. 1997) (partial) 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages against a 
government entity or against an employee. 
(5)"Injuryff means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any 
other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent. 
(6) "Personal injury" means an injury of any kind other than property damage. 
• • • • 
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss of, any right, title, estate, or interest 
in real or personal property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 Claim against state or its employee - Time for 
filing notice. (1998) 
A claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, 
or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the 
attorney general within one year after the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 63-30-11, regardless of whether or not 
the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 Penalty for wrongful refusal to allow writ of habeas 
corpus. (1953) 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who wrongfully 
and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever proper application 
for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the 
party thereby aggrieved. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Robert Dale Straley filed this action against Judge Bruce K. Halliday, who had 
previously denied a petition for an extraordinary writ filed by the plaintiff. R. 1. This 
4 
action was originally dismissed due to the plaintiffs failure to pay the requisite filing fee. 
R. 18. On appeal, this Court reversed that decision. R. 31-33. On remand, the plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint. R. 37. In his amended complaint, Straley alleged that the 
dismissal of his prior petition on the part of the defendant judge had been with fraud and 
malice, and wrongful and willful. R. 38. 
Judge Halliday answered the amended complaint (R. 80-84) and filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the notices of claim were either untimely 
or inadequate, and the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action (partially because his 
claim was barred by res judicata). 
Plaintiff twice sought to recuse the original trial court judge, Judge Lyle R. 
Anderson. R. 48-51, 118-22. The first affidavit of bias was denied by Judge Bryce K. 
Bryner. R. 85-87. The second affidavit of bias was found by Judge Bryce K. Bryner to 
be sufficient. R. 139-43. There was no showing of actual bias on the part of Judge Lyle 
R. Anderson. Instead, the affidavit was found to be sufficient based upon the concerns of 
public perception if a fellow judge of the Seventh District should sit in judgment on a 
claim against a Seventh District Court Judge. R. 142. For this reason, it was determined 
to reassign this action to a judge from another district. Judge John R. Anderson, of the 
Eighth District, was assigned to hear this matter on October 27, 1998. R. 145. At no time 
did the plaintiff file an affidavit of bias against Judge John R. Anderson. On January 25, 
5 
1999, Judge John Anderson's Ruling dismissing this action was filed. R. 149-51. 
Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on January 28, 1999. R. 152. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Robert Dale Straley filed a petition for an extraordinary writ in June, 1996. R. 38. 
That petition was denied as without merit and frivolous by Judge Bruce K. Halliday on 
August 13, 1996. IcL No appeal was apparently taken from the dismissal of this prior 
proceeding, and the correctness of Judge Halliday's decision has not been questioned by 
any further court proceedings (such as the granting of a further extraordinary writ 
petition). 
Plaintiff filed a timely notice of claim dated June 28, 1997. R. 14-17. But in that 
notice of claim, he did not allege that Judge Halliday acted with either fraud or malice. A 
second, untimely, notice of claim dated July 1, 1998, did allege fraud or malice, but it was 
not served on the attorney general as required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1998). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At no time in the trial court did Straley challenge Judge John R. Anderson for bias, 
either actual or perceived. He cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Judge 
Lyle R. Anderson was not actually biased against the plaintiff. His recusal was only done 
because of the accepted practice of not having a judge hear a case in which a fellow judge 
of that district is a party. Judge John R. Anderson is not claimed to be actually biased, 
6 
and because he is not a judge in the same district as the defendant there is no perception 
of any bias on his part towards a fellow judge. 
A notice of claim is required of all plaintiffs who seek to file an action against the 
State of Utah or its employees. Straley's first notice of claim, because it did not claim 
that Judge Halliday acted with fraud or malice, did not give notice to the defendant that 
judgment would be sought against him personally, as opposed to his employer the State 
of Utah. The second notice of claim did indicate that the proposed lawsuit would be 
brought against Judge Halliday personally, but it was untimely and was not filed with the 
Attorney General's Office as required by statute. The Governmental Immunity Act is 
applicable to all state law claims or causes of action for money or damages against 
government entities or their employees. Therefore the trial court was correct when it 
dismissed this action for failure to comply with the immunity act. 
No factual allegations of any kind have been made concerning the claim that Judge 
Halliday's denial of Straley's habeas petition was "wrongful." Plaintiff failed to state a 
prima facia claim and his complaint was properly dismissed. 
Plaintiffs claims against the defendant are barred by res judicata. Judge Halliday's 
decision that Straley's petition was without merit and frivolous is final. It has not been 
set aside on appeal or brought into question by other means. Judge Halliday cannot be 
said to have willfully and wrongfully denied the petition when that dismissal has not been 
reversed or in any manner brought into question. Until such time, if ever, that Judge 
7 
Halliday's decision is reversed or otherwise overturned, no claim can be made against the 
judge for the statutory forfeiture. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STRALEY CANNOT RAISE CLAIMS OF BIAS 
AGAINST JUDGE JOHN R. ANDERSON FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
Judge John R. Anderson was assigned to this action because all of the judicial 
officers of the Seventh District were recused, not for actual bias* but to prevent a public 
perception of bias due to the relationship between Judge Lyle R. Anderson and the 
defendant, Judge Bruce K. Halliday. Straley at no time challenged the propriety of this 
assignment in the trial court. For the first time, on appeal, plaintiff now claims that this 
assignment was improper because 1) the two Judge Andersons may be related,4 and 2) 
Judge John R. Anderson is not a Seventh District Court Judge, but an Eighth District 
Court Judge. 
In Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs 
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that 
claim, the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Appellants1 first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's 
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of 
4
 Though the record is silent on this point. 
8 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this 
claim. 
Id- at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule, referred to in 
Espinal deal with cases in which the appellate court is persuaded that "the trial court 
committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. 
Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913,917-18 (Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted). See also State v. 
Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 853 (Utah 1992); State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992). 
It was the duty of the plaintiff to raise any claim of bias against the trial court 
judge in the trial court. This Straley did against Judge Lyle R. Anderson, and he was 
successful in obtaining then what he now claims was improper, a judge from outside the 
Seventh District to hear the matter. Straley's new claim that somehow Judge John R. 
Anderson was biased cannot be raised on appeal for the first time. Further, plaintiff has 
not briefed the question of whether plain error or other exceptional circumstances might 
exist that could lead this Court to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. Where 
the plaintiff has not analyzed an issue in his opening brief, this Court will not review that 
issue. Brown. 853 P.2d at 854 n.l. 
Even if this Court were to address this issue, Straley cannot prevail. It is 
undisputed that Judge Lyle R. Anderson had not exhibited any bias or prejudice against 
the plaintiff, and no partiality for the defendant. R. 142. The decision of Judge Bryner on 
this issue has not been challenged on appeal. The only reason Judge Lyle R. Anderson 
was recused from this matter was because of his working relationship of being an 
9 
employee of the Seventh District Court, as is the defendant judge. No such concern of 
public perception of bias would be applicable to Judge John R. Anderson, regardless of 
his relationship with Judge Lyle R. Anderson. 
Nor is there any merit to Straley's claim that somehow Judge John R. Anderson, as 
an Eighth District Court Judge was without authority to hear this matter in the Seventh 
District. Such an assignment is expressly authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-9.5 
(1988). 
A judge of a court of record may serve temporarily as a judge in another 
geographic division or in another court of record, in accordance with the 
Utah Constitution and the rules of the Judicial Council. 
The assignment of another judge to "replace the judges in that location because of 
disqualification in a particular case" is expressly authorized by the Rules of Judicial 
Administration adopted by the Judicial Council. Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 
3-108(l)(D). Indeed, the rules call for the assignment of another active judge "from a 
court of equal jurisdiction in a different geographical division . . . who are physically 
situated nearest and are most convenient to that court;". Rules of Judicial Administration, 
Rule 3-108(2)(B)(i). Judge John R. Anderson, from the adjacent Eighth District, was 
properly assigned to hear this matter and plaintiff has failed to make a proper showing of 
bias against this judge. Even if this issue was properly before the Court, there would be 
no reason to reverse the trial court's dismissal of this action 
10 
II. THIS ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED 
BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO FILE AN 
ADEQUATE, TIMELY, NOTICE OF CLAIM 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act governs the procedure for suing the State 
of Utah, its agencies, and its employees. The Utah Supreme Court has held that the filing 
of the notice of claim required by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (1993) is a jurisdictional 
precondition to filing any suit against the state or its employees. Rushton v. Salt Lake 
County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Madsen v. Borfhicki 769 P.2d 245, 249-50 
(Utah 1988). Full (strict) compliance with the requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act is essential to maintain a cause of action thereunder. Rushton, 977 P.2d at 
1203-4; Scarborough v. Granite School District. 531 P.2d 480 (Utah 1975). 
The Governmental Immunity Act requires that: 
[a] claim against the state, or against its employee for an act or omission 
occurring during the performance of the emplolyee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the attorney general within one year after the claim 
arises, . . . . 
§63-30-12, in part. 
The Immunity Act defines a claim as "any claim or cause of action for money or 
damages against a government entity or against an employee." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
2(1) (Supp. 1997). Plaintiffs forfeiture action is a claim or cause of action for money. 
11 
The Immunity Act, by its very language, applies to all claims, not just tort claims. 
Constitutional claims for the taking of private property without compensation are 
governed by the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1991). Statutory claims for 
attorneys fees under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) 
must be filed under the Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.6 (1992). The same 
is true of contract actions. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5 (1991). 
In the same manner, plaintiffs statutory claim for money must be brought under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. The Act is generic, and meant to apply to all claims 
brought against governmental entities and their employees. The Immunity Act is 
expressly stated to be the exclusive remedy for any injury suffered at the hands of a 
government entity or its employees. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(3)(a) (1991). The 
purpose of the Act is to provide a framework within which any such claim can be made 
and resolved. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Governmental Immunity Act was 
applicable to the plaintiffs claims. To do otherwise would be to create a unique 
exception from the legislatively created system for handling all claims against the 
government and cause confusion as to which claims for money or damages came under 
the Immunity Act and which did not. The legislature has not made such an exception in 
this case and the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff was required to comply 
with the Governmental Immunity Act. 
12 
Under the Act, a claim against an employee is actually against the government 
entity (employer) unless "it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to 
fraud or malice." Utah Code. Ann. 63-30-4(4) (1991).5 To allege personal liability 
against an employee, it is necessary to claim fraud or malice on the part of the employee. 
Otherwise, the claim, if any, is only against the employing government entity. In his 
original (timely) notice of claim, Straley did not strictly comply with the requirements of 
the Immunity Act. He did not articulate that fraud or malice was alleged against Judge 
Halliday. As such, his original notice of claim could only show that a claim was being 
made against the State of Utah and its court system, not against an individual employee. 
Only in his second, untimely and improperly filed (it was only served on the 
defendant, not on the Attorney General) makes a clear statement that fraud and malice are 
alleged, and therefore a claim is being made against Judge Halliday personally. The 
second notice of claim was untimely and not filed with the attorney general, and was 
therefore jurisdictional^ defective. Rushton, Lamarr v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 828 P.2d 
535, 542 (Utah App. 1992). The first notice of claim only stated a claim against the State 
of Utah, for which the state has retained immunity, and did not articulate that the action 
would be against the individual personally (by alleging fraud or malice) as opposed to in 
his representative capacity. Rushton. 
5
 Such an action against the State of Utah could not be maintained because the 
state has not waived its immunity for injury arising out of discretionary functions and the 
issuance of an order. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) & (2) (1996). 
13 
An action for wrongful and willful refusal to allow a writ, where there was no 
allegation of fraud or malice, would not state a claim against the individual employee, but 
against the governmental entity. Only where fraud or malice is alleged can a claim be 
made against the individual employee personally, as the plaintiff sought to do in this 
action. The first notice of claim was defective and the second untimely and improperly 
served. For this reason the plaintiffs action was correctly dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction and that decision should be affirmed on appeal. 
III. STRALEY'S COMPLAINT FAILED TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1953), states: 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who 
wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever 
proper application for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum 
not exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby aggrieved. 
This statute has remained unchanged since statehood. The writ of habeas corpus 
mentioned in the statute did not determine the legality of a persons incarceration, it 
simply was the mechanism for bringing the individual who claimed to be unlawfully 
detained before the court for a determination as to whether or not the incarceration was 
valid. Rules 65B(b)(5) and 65C(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In Farrell v. Turner. 
482 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1971), the Court explained the requirement in the Rules of Civil 
Procedure that a judge, refusing to order a petitioner to be brought before the court, was 
to set out in writing his or her reasons for denying the writ. 
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This provision of the Rules deals with the case where no writ is issued by 
the court and not to the trial when the petitioner has been produced in court 
pursuant to the writ. Section 78-35-1, U.C.A. 1953, provides for a 
forfeiture of not exceeding $5,000 in case a judge unlawfully and wilfully 
refuses to allow a writ to be issued, and the rule requiring the reasons for 
refusal to allow the writ to be made in writing is intended to be of assistance 
to both the petitioner and the judge in the event the applicant undertakes to 
recover the forfeiture provision of the statute. 
This statute was never meant to be used against a judge who considered the merits 
of a petition for extraordinary writ and then denied the same. It was intended to sanction 
a judicial officer who wrongfully and willfully refused to consider the merits, improperly 
dismissing the petition as frivolous. Other courts, considering similar forfeiture statutes 
have come to the same conclusion Rhodes v. Glenn, 24 S.E.2d 721, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1943) (lower court judge liable for refusing to grant a writ when he mistakenly believed 
the petition was so defective as to warrant a refusal to issue a writ); Blodgett v. Ladd. 162 
N.W. 233 (Iowa 1917); Goetz v. Black. 240 N.W. 94 (Mich. 1932). 
Because Judge Halliday is alleged to have denied Straley's petition as being 
without merit and frivolous without requiring a response from the respondent, the forfeit 
statute would apply if that denial was both wrongful and willful. 
It is not enough that the plaintiffs petition was denied. Straley was required to 
allege facts that would show that the defendant both wrongfully and willfully denied his 
petition. This he failed to do. Wrongful is defined as "Injurious, heedless, unjust, 
reckless, unfair. Infringement of some right.'1 Blacks Law Dictionary 1446 (5th ed. 
1979). An act is willfully done if "done voluntarily and intentionally and with the 
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specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do 
something the law requires to be done; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey 
or to disregard the law." Black's Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979) 
No facts have been alleged other than that the petition was denied. The trial 
court's decision to dismiss this action should be affirmed because no factual basis has 
been alleged to meet the burden of showing that the action of the defendant was wrongful 
and willful. To meet his burden, the plaintiff needed to submit facts that would show that 
the defendant not only denied the prior petition for an extraordinary relief, but that the 
defendant did so in an unjust or reckless manner with the specific intent to deny it, 
knowing that the petition should have been granted with the "bad purpose" of deliberately 
disobeying the law. This he failed to do. 
The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had failed to state facts that 
would demonstrate any claim against the defendant, and the dismissal of this action 
should be affirmed. 
IV, STRALEY WAS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA 
AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL FROM 
RELITIGATING AN ISSUE ALREADY DECIDED 
AGAINST HIM IN HIS PRIOR EXTRAORDINARY 
WRIT PROCEEDING 
Bringing a claim under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35-1 (1953) collaterally challenges 
the defendant judge's decision in a prior extraordinary writ proceeding. To make out a 
prima facia cause of action, a plaintiff is required to prove that the denial of the relief 
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sought in the prior writ proceeding was both wrongful and willful. If the challenged 
decision has not been reversed on appeal, or in some other manner been brought into 
question, then the plaintiff is essentially using a civil forfeiture proceeding as a further 
attempt to relitigate his failed criminal appeal and collateral attacks on his criminal 
sentence. 
A long line of Utah court decisions has held that the doctrine of res judicata bars a 
party from seeking to relitigate not only matters litigated in a previous lawsuit, but any 
matter that could have been litigated between the parties in the prior action. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 645 P.2d 37 (Utah 1982); Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 1981); 
International Resources v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d 575 (Utah 1979). In Office of Recovery 
Services v. V.G.P.. 845 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1992), this Court explained: 
,fThe doctrine of res judicata serves vital public interests beyond any 
individual judge's ad hoc determination of the equities in a particular case." 
These vital public interests include (1) fostering reliance on prior 
adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of 
the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) conserving judicial 
resources. The "doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or 
procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of 
fundamental and substantial justice, 'of public policy and of private peace,1 
which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts lf 
845 P.2d at 946 (citations omitted). Robert Straley's petition for an extraordinary writ 
was denied, and found to be both meritless and frivolous. That final decision has not 
been changed or altered on appeal, or in any other manner. Straley is prohibited by res 
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judicata from seeking to collaterally attack Judge Halliday's decision in the present 
action. 
To permit such a collateral attack on a valid prior decision would be contrary to all 
four of the "vital public interests" which underlie the doctrine. The defendant does not 
claim that only a denial of a writ of habeas corpus that has been reversed on appeal can be 
subject to the statutory forfeiture. Judge Halliday does argue that under the doctrine of 
res judicata the challenged decision must have been either reversed or otherwise brought 
into question. This is no different than the tort of malicious prosecution. One of the 
elements of malicious prosecution is that the criminal proceeding terminate in favor of the 
accused. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 1989). To do 
otherwise would be to defeat the very reasons for which the doctrine of res judicata was 
created, and to permit the continual relitigation of a question that has already been 
decided by a final judgment against the litigant. A final, still valid, decision denying a 
petition for habeas corpus cannot be said to be "wrongful" until it has been reversed or 
otherwise overturned. 
If Straley can bring a forfeiture action against a judge for a decision that is still 
valid and final, a unique opportunity is created for inconsistent decisions. To succeed in 
this action, Straley would have to convince the court that his petition for an extraordinary 
writ should have been granted. And yet the trial court would be then placed in the 
quandary of providing monetary relief against the defendant judge, but being without 
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authority to release the plaintiff from incarceration. The plaintiff would be criminally 
guilty still, but civilly considered not guilty. 
In Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), the United States Supreme Court 
adopted such a rule for challenges to criminal proceedings (including writs of habeas 
corpus) brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a 
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A 
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that 
has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. 
Id. at 2372 (emphasis in original). 
Defendants urge this Court to find that a plaintiff can not state a cause of action 
under section 78-35-1 when the decision he challenges has not been reversed or otherwise 
invalidated. To do otherwise would permit actions, such as the current one, in which a 
litigious party can continually seek to relitigate the same issues. First, Straley sought 
relief by means of a petition for extraordinary relief. That relief was denied and Straley 
did not see fit to appeal that decision or otherwise challenge it. Now, he has filed this 
statutory cause of action challenging the propriety of a trial court decision that has never 
been properly called into question. The very same reasons that led the United States 
Supreme Court to not permit the use of § 1983 actions as a method of collateral attack to 
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a valid criminal conviction suggest that Utah's forfeiture statute should not be so used 
either. 
The issue preclusion theory of res judicata, also known as collateral estoppel, is 
also applicable to this action. 
The party seeking to invoke this doctrine must satisfy four requirements. 
First, the party must show that the issue challenged in the case at hand is 
identical to the issue decided in the previous action. Second, the issue in 
the previous action must have been decided in a final judgment on the 
merits. Third, the issue in the previous action must have been competently, 
fully, and fairly litigated. Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand 
must have been either a party or privy to the previous action. 
Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995). 
There can be no question but that each of these four elements have been met in this 
matter. The dismissal of the prior writ proceeding was expressly based upon a finding 
that the petition was without merit (contrary to the current claims of the plaintiff that it 
was wrongly denied). There is no dispute but that the challenged decision of Judge 
Halliday acted as a final judgment on the prior writ proceeding. The laws of Utah give 
the trial court authority to make such a determination. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 65B(b)(5) and Rule 65C(g). And finally, the plaintiff was the petitioner in the prior 
action. 
All four elements are clearly met and the current action was properly dismissed 
based upon both res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, defendant Judge Bruce K. Halliday asks this Court to 
affirm the dismissal of this action. 
DEFENDANT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL ARGUMENT 
OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
The defendant-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter. The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a 
published opinion are necessary, though the defendant desires to participate in oral 
argument if such is held by the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this of July, 1999. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Defendant-Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this the /£ day of July, 
1999: 
Robert Dale Straley 
USP #24725 UINTA 4-608 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY v ^ X i ^ -
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT DALE STRALEY ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
BRUCE K. HALLIDAY, ] 
Individually and in his 
Official Capacity 
Defendant. 
| R U L I N G 
| Civil No: 970700375 
1 Judge: John* R. Anderson 
The undersigned Judge of the Eighth District Court, by special 
appointment, has carefully reviewed the Pending Motions and Memoranda and 
Response filed in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the 
Alternative Motion to Dismiss, Motion to Stay Discovery and the Motion to Strike 
Pleadings. 
The Plaintiffs Pleading will be stricken as per rule 7 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 
The Defendants Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be and is 
granted for the reasons set forth in Defendants Memorandum in Support. 
The Court also is of the opinion that the enabling statute, Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-35-1, applies to a situation only where a Judge wrongfully 
refuses to act upon or even consider the writ. Obviously there could not be an 
intended claim for relief every time a writ was denied. If the Judge considers the 
writ and denies if after due consideration and gives reasons in writing there can 
be no claim under this section. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Defendants Motion to Stay Discovery is now 
moot. 
Dated this 
udge John R. Anderson 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
the following parties on the_ _day of January, 1999. 
Robert Dale Straiey 
c/o Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Peggy E. Stone 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Honorable Lyle R. Anderson 
Seventh District Court 
P.O. Box 68 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Brent Johnson 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140241 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 
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